Introduction
Operation Apache Snow was a joint push from May 10, 1969 to June 7, 1969 by units of the US Army and the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam). The aim was to drive the PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam) and National Liberation Front (NLF or Viet Cong) forces from the 45 kilometer-long A Shau Valley, the main route from Laos and the Ho Chi Minh Trail into central Vietnam. The valley was well-known to the Americans and South Vietnamese, having been the scene of three previous operations that resulted in over 2,000 Communist casualties, yet all three attacks had failed to dislodge the enemy.
The PAVN conducted a fighting retreat to prepared positions on Hill 937 (Ap Bia Mountain in Vietnamese), which resulted in the pivotal and most-famous battle of the operation. The American and South Vietnamese units required 12 assaults up the hill before finally capturing it and destroying the fortifications. The casualties were heavy: 87 KIA, 367 wounded and 7 missing. The troops dubbed the battle site "Hamburger Hill" to evoke the Korean War's "Pork Chop Hill." The reference wasn't just to the ferocity of the fighting, but to the stupidity of the battle itself: after securing Hamburger Hill, it was determined it had no military value, and was abandoned.
James H. Willbanks, a distinguished professor emeritus from the Army's Command and Staff College, and himself a Vietnam vet, has published a history of the battle newly released by Osprey Publishing.
Contents
The 96-page book is in the standard Osprey Publishing 10" x 7" soft-cover format. The text is divided into:
- Origins of the Campaign
- Chronology
- Opposing Commanders
- Opposing Forces
- Opposing Plans
- The Campaign
- Aftermath
- The Battlefield Today (not for the armchair historian)
- Further Reading (including nearly 20 books and multiple online sources)
- Index
The Review
The battle of Hill 937/Dong Ap Bia (dubbed "Hamburger Hill" by a nameless GI on a scribbled sign) is one of the most-controversial in a war known for its many controversies. It's excellent that Prof. Willbanks has set out the battle and its aftermath for today's audience, including both the martial and political components. Vietnam apologists always insist that "the United States was never defeated on the battlefield" when, in fact, the notion of victory or defeat on the battlefields there defied conventional definitions. The other side frequently was dictating the time, place and duration of any fight, which led to over 50,000 dead Americans, but no "victory." The US had embarked on an old-fashioned war of attrition in 1965, but by 1969, the public had grown weary of the war. The US voting public determined the expense of blood and treasure was unjustified, so the author's inclusions of the political ramifications of the battle is spot-on, since they are almost as important as the martial aspects.
Prof. Willbanks sets out nicely the campaign by US and ARVN forces to interdict the A Shau Valley and punish the North Vietnamese units there. Hill 937/Dong Ap Bia was hardly the most-important objective initially, too. Ground forces were helicoptered into the region to a series of landing zones (LZs) prepared by "Daisy Cutter" super bombs. As usual, the Americans plunged into the battle with limited intel; they knew this was a major route from the North to the South, and that NVA forces were there in strength. But as often was the case in the war, the US soon discovered they had greatly underestimated the size of their opponent.
Almost from the moment they arrived, the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies realized they had stumbled upon a major concentration of enemy forces. Prepared bunkers, cook fires and other clues indicated Hill 937 would be a crucial locale in the campaign, so the decision was made to move on it, in spite of classic signs of an ambush. Instead of adjusting the tactics to a changing situation, the US commander of the troops going up the hill, Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt, insisted the larger enemy force was an opportunity to "kill more Communists." This, of course, played to to the strength of the PAVN units: laying elaborately-planned ambushes amid strong, prepared positions that included bunkers and even Soviet-made MON-100 claymore mines placed in the trees that would rain shrapnel down on attackers. But mostly it was the nearly 4-1 advantage in manpower the NVA had over the Americans that required reinforcements and twelve assaults to take the hill.
The ensuing battle is set out in a direct narrative that follows the days of attack, counter-attack and attrition. Often descriptions of battles are lists of actions, but Willbanks constructs a gripping narrative that quietly reveals the poor tactical execution by the commanders on the ground. The book includes several topographical maps, though I would have preferred a little more dimensional detail to them. Fortunately, the fifth and final assault on the hill is set out in a 3D map that shows the rugged terrain and steep inclines. Still, even without more maps, the narrative is easy to follow, and the result is a clear picture of how things went down.
The tragedy of the battle is that after suffering heavy casualties in a bruising fight, the overall commander of the operation decided Dong Ap Bia was of no military value, and withdrew. The North Vietnamese promptly re-occupied the hill and the surrounding valley. Once Americans back home learned of the expenditure of life for an objective of no military value, a firestorm of criticism ensued. After all, President Richard Nixon had run on a promise to end the war, and former overall commander William Westmoreland had been relieved because of his failed policy of fighting a war of attrition against an enemy willing to pay any price in blood. Even to this day, questions remain why the US had attempted a more-or-less conventional infantry assault, instead of blasting the position with its overwhelming artillery and airborne power. There remain questions, too, about the use of such air power in close proximity to ground troops. Several "friendly fire" incidents resulted in the deaths and wounding of American GIs.
One criticism of the book is it could use some editing. The author has a wealth of information at hand, but not all of it is relevant or even interesting. For example, the chapter on "Opposing Commanders" is mostly an appendix-style list of officers and their resumes. I didn't really care where most of the unit commanders got their experience, nor where they ended up later on. And so little is known about the Vietnamese commanders as to make the chapter more or less unnecessary because of its imbalance. On the other hand, the chapter on "The Battlefield Today" is a nice reminder that the Second Vietnam War is still quite vividly apparent should one take the time to travel to that fascinating country.
Conclusion
We seem to be in the midst of a boomlet in interest in the Vietnam War, so it's good to see individual operations and battles covered by historians, who now have the advantage of consulting veterans and declassified files. Hamburger Hill 1969 will help in the rediscovery of the war by younger modelers and history buffs, setting out not only its military significance, but the moral and political firestorm it unleashed that changed the American attitude about the conflict, and pushed the United States towards Vietnamization and the eventual end of the conflict with South Vietnam's defeat six years later.
Thanks to Osprey Publishing for providing this review copy. Please be sure to mention you saw the book reviewed on Armorama when purchasing your copy.
So-called "Daisy Cutter" bomb used to create instant Landing Zones (LZs).